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Abstract This note develops a simple occupational choice model to examine three
types of selection biases that may occur in empirically estimating the premium for
uncertain wages. Individuals may select themselves into risky (wage-uncertain) jobs
because they have (1) lower risk aversion, or (2) lower income risks, or (3) higher
individual ability. We show that (1) gives no bias, (2) biases the OLS estimate of the
risk-premium in a wage regression upward, and (3) yields a bias that analytically may
be positive or negative, but empirically is more likely to be negative if our occupational
choice model is correct.
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1 Introduction
A modest literature acknowledges the fact that individuals contemplating an investment
in an education–occupation career trajectory are unable to make a perfect prediction
of the associated wage because they face a distribution of wages rather than a single
wage rate after they complete a given education. This literature seeks to test the hypo-
thesis of compensation for the differences in variability of wages within occupations
and/or educations, as the premium that has to be paid to overcome individuals’ risk
aversion, a hypothesis already discussed by Smith (1776/1976, p. 208). In these
models, individual wages are regressed on measures of income risk, typically the
residual variance of wages, within occupations or educations (King 1974;
McGoldrick 1995; McGoldrick and Robst 1996; Feinberg 1981). A series of recent
papers confirms the basic finding that wages are higher in occupations/educations
where the variance of wages is greater (Hartog et al. 2003; Hartog and Vijverberg
2007; Diaz Serrano et al. 2003; Diaz Serrano and Hartog 2006; Christiansen and
Nielsen 2002).
To be more precise, the model is commonly estimated in two stages. The first stage is
a standard Mincer earnings equation where wages are regressed on experience (linear
and squared), demographic characteristics and regional variables as well as a fixed
effect that captures common factors across wage workers grouped by education and/or
occupation, i.e., groups that face the same wage risk. The residuals from this equation
then yield group-specific measures of earnings uncertainty, typically the variance.1 In
the second stage, variance is added to the regression equation. Theory predicts that
variance has a positive effect on wages, as potential students require compensation for
risk. Estimates for seven countries so far all confirm this prediction, at high levels of
significance. Roughly, the estimates indicate an increase in expected income by some
1 to 4% for an increase in risk (variance) of 10%.
The results in the papers cited above are commonly criticised for ignoring selectivity
problems. Indeed, the simple two-stage model faces three problems that may bias the
estimated regression coefficient as a measure of risk aversion. First, evidence suggests
that risk attitudes differ among individuals (Hartog et al. 2002; Dohmen et al. 2006).
Unlike related literature that estimates a single coefficient of risk aversion, we will
reflect on the implication of heterogeneous risk attitudes.
Second, it is quite possible that the earnings risk of an education differs among
individuals. Cunha et al. (2005) claim that 60% of variability in returns to education is
forecastable at the individual level and, hence, is related to individual heterogeneity,
leaving 40% for risk. The reason could be that some individuals may by their nature
be very targeted and organised, others may take life less as a controlled operation;
and just as some individuals may be very accurate in manual activities, while others
have larger dispersion in their performances, in the same way dispersion in mental
activities may vary between individuals (see also Hartog 2002). We therefore believe
that it is quite relevant to analyze the implications of selection on individual-specific
risk on estimated risk premiums in wages.
1 The literature also considers skew, but that is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Third, individuals differ in ability: variation in a wide array of abilities among
individuals is well documented.2 If individuals know their abilities, but the researcher
does not, correction for selectivity bias is in order. However, it may be that individuals
are no better informed and can only assess the relevant distribution of earnings from
observing workers already active in an occupation, without adjustment for ability.3
Thus, one may argue over the extent to which individuals are informed about their own
abilities. We will therefore analyse both the case where individuals are fully ignorant
on their ability and the case where they are fully informed.
Under the assumption that there are no selection problems, the OLS estimator
indeed correctly estimates the true economic price of risk. With selection of indivi-
duals in risky jobs, we can no longer be sure that this is the case. This note shows,
using a simple occupational choice model, that the OLS estimate is unbiased under
selection on risk aversion. OLS estimates are biased upward if selection on income
risks is important. If both income risk and risk aversion differ among individuals, we
cannot recover structural parameters from a single wage equation, but we can give a
precise interpretation of the estimated coefficient. Under heterogeneity in unobserved
ability, the bias in OLS estimates is ambiguous, and we revert to simulation with rea-
sonable parameter values. The next three sections derive these results. The last section
concludes.
2 Modeling the risk premium under selectivity
Individuals can choose between two types of jobs. There is a safe job without wage
uncertainty where individual n earns wsn . Alternatively, there is a risky job where
individual n earns w˜rn = wrn +εn , where wrn is the expected wage and εn is the random
component, with mean zero and variance σ 2εn , independent from wrn . The expected
wage is what the individual expects to earn on the basis of known skills and abilities;
he can infer it from the wages of individuals with the same observable skills and
abilities as he has. The random component reflects risks inherent in fluctuations in
demand and supply conditions, unknown specifics of future employment, inherent
randomness in individual performance and randomness due to aptitudes and abilities
that the individual does not know when choosing a job (or, in the broader context, an
education; see also Levhari and Weiss 1974).
There is a continuum of individuals indexed n ∈ [n,∞), n > 0, who may differ
in three dimensions: risk aversion ρn , variance of earnings in the risky job σ 2εn and
expected wages in risky work wrn . These characteristics are assumed to be uncorrelated
2 Chen (2008) and Chen and Khan (2007) correct for selectivity bias when estimating the risk associated
with an education.
3 Dominitz and Manski (1996) show that students in the U.S. are highly uncertain about the benefits gained
from an education. Wolter (2000) reports the same result for Swiss students. Hartog and Webbink (2004)
report that first-year students can predict mean salaries by education but they cannot predict their own
starting salary after graduation, four years ahead: the correlation between an individual’s prediction and the
realisation is 0.06. The degree to which individuals are not informed about their abilities represents risk all
the same.
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with the random component εn of the wage at the risky job, which indeed is consistent
with our characterization of εn .
Assuming that utility is a mean-variance function, selection by maximum expected
utility implies4 that we can write for the marginal individual (denoted by an asterisk)
wr∗ − 1
2
ρ∗σ ∗2ε = ws∗. (1)
If all individuals would be identical in ability, risk and risk attitude, we could drop
the asterisk. A competitive market would establish a wage differential between the
safe and the risky job equal to one half of the variance in risky wages weighted by the
coefficient of risk aversion, an application of the standard model for risk compensation
(e.g., Gollier 2001, 19–20). This is essentially the model underlying the estimates of
risk compensation referred to in the introduction. Under those conditions OLS yields
an unbiased estimate of the coefficient of risk aversion (i.e., the price of risk). In this
two-sector specification, it is estimated as twice the wage gap divided by the variance
in the risky sector. The variance is an unbiased estimator of risk, as it is identical for
everyone and observations are not blurred by selectivity. Allocation of individuals to
sectors is arbitrary, as they yield identical expected utility.
Extension to the case where individuals only differ in risk attitude is straightforward.
If individuals are identical in all dimensions except risk aversion risk aversion of the








All individuals with ρn > ρ∗ will not choose the risky job and all individuals with
ρn < ρ
∗ will. The expected market wage in the risky job should just compensate the
marginal worker and will be equal to
wr = ws + 1
2
ρ∗σ 2ε , (3)
and the observed variance of wages in the risky job equals
V [w˜r |ρn < ρ∗] = E
[(
w˜r − E[w˜r |ρn < ρ∗]
)2 |ρn < ρ∗
]
= σ 2ε , (4)
as all individuals have the same risk. Hence, the OLS estimate for the risk-premium
1
2ρ
∗ is consistent and unbiased.
We have specified the earnings function in terms of wages, whereas it is conventional
in empirical work to specify a function for log wages. However, the only widely
accepted theoretical underpinning, Mincer’s human capital model, only applies for
variables reflecting investment (years of schooling, experience). For other variables it
4 This follows from a second-order Taylor approximation for a standard utility function, see Varian (1978)
and Hartog and Vijverberg (2007).
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is not at all obvious that the relationship with wages should be logarithmic. In practice,
labour supply may react to absolute wage differences at the low end of the scale and
to relative differences at the high end. Blue-collar and low pay service worker, often
paid on an hourly basis, tend to measure, perceive and evaluate wage differences in
euro’s (or dollars). For workers at the high end, differences tend to be evaluated at a
relative (percentage) scale. This suggests that somewhere along the line, the underlying
relevant scale for labour supply behaviour switches from absolute to relative. With
respect to risk attitude, there is a similar ambivalence. Absolute risk aversion leads to
risk compensation in euro’s, relative risk aversion leads to relative compensation. In
the formal development of our argument, we specify an earnings function in wages.
In the qualitative sense (positive, negative or ambiguous bias) our analysis also holds
for a logarithmic wage function. In the Appendix, we formally derive a logarithmic
model that is fully equivalent to our model in the main text; according to that model, all
our conclusions hold provided we interpret the coefficient of risk aversion as relative
rather than absolute
Throughout this paper, we discuss issues in terms of risk averse individuals. Howe-
ver, the model is perfectly general, and also covers risk loving. Career choices based
on a taste for risk are certainly conceivable. In the empirical work, positive estimates
for ρ are the rule and we take risk aversion to be the normal case.
3 Selection on income risk
Now consider the case in which risk in the risky job, σ 2εn , differs between individuals.
Ex ante, this is a risk; ex ante, individuals know the dispersion of the distribution
relevant to them and base their occupational choice on it. Ex post, they will be paid
according to performance that is random. Individuals are equal in all other respects,







Individuals with σεn > σ ∗ε will not take the risky job and workers with σεn < σ ∗ε do.
Wage realisations in the risky job will vary because of different risk. The variance of
observed wages will reflect the mean variance of individuals who have selected into
the risky job, which is lower than the risk for the marginal worker. The market will
compensate the marginal worker in the risky job, at a price 12ρ. Since the observed
wage variance is an underestimate of the risk that the marginal worker faces, too much
of the wage gap between the safe and the risky job is allocated to risk aversion—as
(5) indicates, dividing the estimated wage gap by the underestimated variance yields
an overestimate of risk aversion. The magnitude of the overestimation will depend on
the underestimation of risk, that is, on the relation between marginal and average risk.
This will depend on the distribution function of risk and the number of individuals
selecting the risky job.
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For example, consider the case where risk follows a normal distribution truncated




. Under this assumption, the bias increases with the
level of threshold risk (i.e., marginal risk σ ∗ε ) and may increase or decrease with the
dispersion θ of risk across individuals. Defining v∗ = (σ ∗ε −µ)/θ and v0 = −µ/θ , and
denoting the standard normal probability density and cumulative distribution functions
with φ () and  () respectively, the mean observed risk equals,
E
[
σε|σε < σ ∗ε
] = µ − θ φ (v
∗) − φ (v0)
(v∗) −  (v0) ≡ µ − θλ. (6)
Define the degree of underestimation (or bias) of risk as the difference between the
threshold risk5 and mean risk:
D = σ ∗ε − E
[
σε|σε < σ ∗ε
] = σ ∗ε − µ + θλ (7)
Note that λ > (<)0 as v∗ > (<)−v0, or σ ∗ε > (<) 2µ. Because of this, the spread of
risk among the population has an ambiguous impact on the bias. Furthermore, applying
L’Hôpital’s Rule shows that D goes to 0 when σ ∗ε converges to 0, the smallest value
it could have. Moreover,
∂ D
∂σ ∗ε
= 1 − v∗λ − λ2 − (v
∗ + λ) φ (v0)
(v∗) −  (v0)
= V
[












(v∗) −  (v0) > 0 (8)
The slope as represented on the first line is difficult to evaluate but it may be written as
the scaled sum of the conditional variance of σε, which is positive, and the conditional
mean of σε, which is positive as well. Thus, D rises from 0 as σ ∗ε grows: the higher
the upper bound, the larger the difference between the bound and the conditional
mean. In our application, this means that the underestimation of risk and hence, the
overestimation of risk aversion, increases with an increase in the dispersion of risk
and with an increase in marginal risk.6
If individuals also differ in risk aversion, the situation is more complicated. Now,
there is no longer a single marginal worker, but a set of marginal workers, defined




)∗ = (wr − ws). A marginal worker may have a large risk aversion and a
low income risk, or a low risk aversion and a large income risk. Structural parameters
of interest are now the parameters of the joint distribution of risk and risk aversion,
5 We use threshold risk as the benchmark, as this is the relevant parameter in our case: the market would
determine the price of risk ρ as the wage gap per unit of risk for the marginal worker.
6 A truncated normal distribution allows for a nonnegligible number of jobs with near-zero risk, which
may be realistic since zero-risk jobs are present as well. Alternatively, one might assume that σε follows
a lognormal distribution, without truncation and therefore in essence without job with near-zero risk. This
leads to the same results, since σε < σ∗ε implies ln σε < ln σ∗ε and thus the relationship between D and σ∗ε
is a nonlinear but monotonic transformation of the case just examined here.
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and they can never be estimated from a single wage regression. The best we can hope
for is an estimate of the threshold contour, and a decomposition of this threshold in
combinations of risk aversion and risk at the margin.
Formally, workers will take a risky job as long as E [w˜rn
]














into a risky job. For the mean of the observed wages, that is, the wages of those who
select into risky jobs, we have:7
E
[
w˜r |ρσ 2ε <
(
ρσ 2ε














)∗]] = wr (9)
since ε is independent of ρ and σ 2ε . This means that the estimated wage gap between
the risky and the safe job is an unbiased estimate of the threshold for entering the
risky job. But we cannot divide by a single estimate of risk to get a single estimate of
marginal risk aversion. All combinations of risk and risk aversion that multiply to the
threshold value are permissible. With heterogeneity in risk, the observed variance in











w˜r |ρσ 2ε <
(
ρσ 2ε















again since ε is independent of ρ and σ 2ε , and where the last expectation is conditional





Equations (9) and (10) provide an interpretation of the regression coefficient: it is
the highest degree of risk aversion among those in a risky job who face a level of risk
equal to the average among all workers who hold risky jobs. One may debate whether
this is interesting information, or whether one would rather uncover the mean risk
aversion among the population or the mean risk aversion among risky job holders or
the maximum admitted value of risk aversion at the population mean risk. But the fact
of the matter is that the truly interesting parameters are those of the joint distribution
of risk and risk aversion, and they can not be recovered from a single wage regression.
To search for answers in this regard, a more elaborate model and a more extensive
dataset are needed.
7 A subscript on the E operator denotes the random variable over which the expectation is taken. The
superscript c denotes a conditional expectation.
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4 Differences in ability
What is the impact of unobserved abilities on estimated risk premiums? As the
introduction indicated that full information is not necessarily the correct assumption,
let us start by assuming that individuals do not know their exact ability in the risky job
but rather only the distribution from which their performance will be drawn. We will
assume identical risk attitudes and equal ability in the safe job: ρn = ρ,wsn = ws .
Moreover, risk is also identical: σ 2εn = σ 2ε , where as always σ 2εn refers to the variance
of the random income component εn .
Assume an individual’s expected wage in the risky job is given by the sum of a
common wage component ωr and individual ability an , where an is a draw from a
distribution with mean 0 and variance σ 2a :
wrn ≡ ωr + an . (11)
Thus, an individual’s ability an matters only for the risky job.8 As before, the observed
wage is determined by w˜rn = wrn + εn . As noted, we will assume that all individuals
face identical risk, reflected in the variance σ 2ε . Now, clearly, individuals will only
be observed in the risky job if they are compensated for the ability risk as well. As
individuals are identical in every aspect except for unknown ability an , the expected
risky wage equals E
[
wrn
] = ωr for all n, which contains no reference to an . As a








σ 2a + σ 2ε
)
, (12)
assuming ability an and risk εn are uncorrelated. The variance in the safe job is zero,
the variance in the risky job is σ 2a + σ 2ε , and this is exactly what individuals demand
compensation for: regressing wages on variances identifies ρ, the price of risk. Hence,
the estimate for ρ is unbiased. In our reading, an represents the type of risk Smith was
concerned about: “The probability that any particular person shall ever be qualified
for the employment to which he is educated is very different in different occupa-
tions. … In a profession where twenty fail for one that succeeds, that one ought to
gain all that should have been gained by the unsuccessful twenty” (Smith 1776/1976,
p. 208).
If individuals know their ability but the researcher does not, we must address the
selectivity process. We might consider the situation where ability differences take
effect as constant advantage: both wsn and wrn vary across individuals but with constant
productivity advantage between risky and safe jobs: wrn −wsn = c. Analytically, this is
not a very interesting case, since, with productivity gap, risk aversion and risk fixed and
identical for every individual, there is no mechanism to establish an equilibrium, since
ρσ 2ε /2 may always be less than or greater than c. Moreover, constant (or absolute)
8 Technically, this unknown ability cannot possibly impact the productivity at a risk-free job. With unknown
ability, the job would not be risk-free anymore. On the other hand, if an impacts the safe job, making it
risky to the degree of σ 2a makes no difference to the conclusion drawn from this case that ρ is estimated
without bias, as is evident from Eq. (12), appropriately modified.
123
Self-selection bias in estimated wage premiums for earnings risk 279
advantage is unlikely to hold in practice (Cunha et al. 2005; Willis and Rosen 1979).
Hence, we will not elaborate this case.
More interesting and relevant is the case of varying advantage where wsn is identical
for all individuals, and wrn reflects an advantage in the risky job that depends on ability:
the productivity gap is individual-specific.9 Let us assume that individuals only differ in
their ability to earn incomes; everyone has equal risk aversion, ρn = ρ, and equal risk,
σ 2εn = σ 2ε . Individuals again choose their sector based on expected wages, allowing for
differences in risk. The marginal worker will be indifferent, and hence, the marginal
worker in the risky job is defined by
w∗ = ws + 1
2
ρσ 2ε . (13)
Individuals with expected wage wrn < w∗ will take the safe job; individuals with
wrn > w
∗ will take the risky job. There will not be a separate risk premium established
by supply reactions, as in the standard case of compensating wage differentials. Rather,
the risk premium will be covered by the ability rent: only individuals with an expected
wage gain high enough to cover the required risk premium will opt for the risky
job.
If we are able to control completely for all relevant ability, the parameters are all
identified. This, of course, gives panel data estimation an advantage over estimation
from cross-section data.10 Residual variance identifies risk. Thus, after controlling for
ability and hence accounting for wrn − ws , a regression of wages on residual variance
should find no effect, since the difference has expected value zero and is unrelated to
its variance. Applying a selectivity correction would make no difference in this case,
as all wage differences between the two jobs are accounted for by observed ability
differences (i.e., the variables explaining the gap between wrn and ws). However, the
price of risk ρ is identified from the selection equation (13).
In the case where we cannot control for ability and cannot control for the selection
process, the observations on wages and variances combine heterogeneity and risk
effects. For individuals in risky jobs, let wrn once again be defined by (11) and w˜rn =




] = ωr + an with a risk of V [εn] = σ 2ε , which implies the assumption
of independence between ability and random income components.11 The marginal
worker requires a compensation of 12ρσ
2
ε to overcome his exposure to income risk; in
other words, ωr +a∗ = ws + 12ρσ 2ε , where a∗ is this marginal worker’s ability. Workers
9 A third case where wrn , wsn and wrn − wsn all vary across n is analytically similar and does not need to be
discussed separately.
10 It is not obvious that panel data are the perfect solution in all cases. Panel data may allow for elimination
of non-observed ability, but it is not so clear that panel data can also be exploited to eliminate individual
specific preferences or earnings risk profiles, which may also bias the results as we have shown in the
previous sections.
11 This independence assumption is innocuous. If something in εn correlates with an , the value of E [εn |an ]
is actually a payoff to ability and so belongs to an already.
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with a higher level of ability accept risky jobs. As a result, the average observed wage
equals
E[w˜r |a > a∗] = ωr + E[a|a > a∗]. (14)
Note that the subscript n is dropped as this describes the mean across all who hold
risky jobs. Similarly, the observed variance of wages in risky jobs is given by
V
(
w˜r |a > a∗) = E
[(
ε + a − E [a|a > a∗])2 |a > a∗
]
(15)
which may be rewritten as
V [w˜r |a > a∗] = V [ε|a > a∗] + V [a|a > a∗] + 2cov[a, ε|a > a∗] (16)
The observed variance in wages is the sum of the variance of the random residual
income component ε, the variance of ability a across individuals and the covariance
between ε and a, all conditional on a being larger than a∗. As we assume independence
between ability and risk, (16) simplifies: V (ε|a > a∗)=σ 2ε and cov
[
a, ε|a > a∗]=0.
Thus, let us pull the threads together. The value of ρ relates to the parameters of
the model as
ρ = ω
r + a∗ − ws
σ 2ε /2
(17)
but its estimate must rely on sample information represented by the equation
ρˆ = E
[
w˜r |a > a∗] − ws
V
[
w˜r |a > a∗]/2 =
ωr + E [a|a > a∗] − ws(




Both the numerator and the denominator in (18) are larger than those in (17). As a
result the bias in the estimate of ρ becomes indeterminate.
The direction of the bias depends of course on the magnitudes of E
[
a|a > a∗]−a∗
and V (a|a > a∗) relative to the other parameters of the model. It is possible that for
plausible parameter values and plausible distributions of a and ε the bias still tends to
point in one particular direction. To get an indication which way the bias will go, let
us simulate this model, based on a guess of reasonable parameter values.
As the model presented in this paper is additive in ability and risk, it is quite natural







, and thus V
[
w˜
] = σ 2a +σ 2ε . Of course, the earnings function literature uses
log earnings and lognormal distributions, hence employing a multiplicative structure
of ability and risk, whereas our model has an additive structure. Even so, it is still
desirable to simulate it with a skewed distribution such as the lognormal as well.
Since in the lognormal distribution both mean and variance move with the parameter
that measures spread, we make an adjustment to maintain an expected value of zero.
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We start from w˜ = ωr +a +ε. As to distributions we assume a# ∼ logN (0, σ 2ln a
)
and ε#∼ logN (0, σ 2ln ε
)
, and we transform a = a# − E [a#] and ε = ε# − E [ε#].12








ln a − 1
)




ln ε − 1
)
(19)
For parameter values, we start from V
[
w˜
] = 43.4059, which holds for a lognormal
distribution with E [w] = 15 and standard error of the regression equal to 0.42. This
dispersion is taken from the wage regressions with data from the Current Population
Survey in Hartog and Vijverberg (2007); the mean just matches quite nicely with our
simulations. We let σln ε vary between 1.15 and 1.35, implying V [ε] ranges from 10.33




is constrained at 43.4059, σln a and σln ε relate negatively,
allowing this simulation exercise to consider the effect of changes in the relative weight
of heterogeneity and risk. The wage in the safe job ws is fixed at 10, but through ωr
the expected wage in the risky job varies, to allow for variation in the proportion of
individuals choosing the risky job.
The simulation generates 10,000 workers who choose between the safe and the risky








w˜r |a > a∗]
where a∗ = ws + 0.5ρσ 2ε − ωr . In other words, ρˆ equals the ratio of two times
the difference in the average wage on risky jobs and the wage on safe jobs over the
variance among risky jobs. The observed wage of the risky job contains a and ε. In
fact, all of the distribution of ε is represented, but only the right tail of the distribution
of a is allowed to contribute to the observed risky wage distribution.
Results are given in Table 1. For the normal distribution, we always find workers
in both jobs. For the lognormal distribution, the ability distribution has a short lower
tail and a long upper tail, so with large ωr , everyone prefers the risky job and we will
ignore such cases. For the normal distribution case, ρ is always overestimated. An
increase in ωr has a non-monotonic effect on ρˆ. Basically, there is a U-shaped pattern,
although it is not always fully visible: it depends on the ability/risk ratio. If ability
variation increases and risk decreases, the positive bias grows larger if ρ = 0.4, and
moves non-monotonically if ρ = 0.6.
For the lognormal distribution, ρˆ is always underestimated. If ωr increases, ρˆ
increases, and hence, the bias decreases. If ability variation increases and risk
decreases, ρˆ moves non-monotonically (U-shaped), although again, the parameter
combination may allow only part of the U to show up.
The differently signed biases in the two cases can be understood from the underlying
distributions. By design, σ 2ε is similar between the normal and lognormal specifica-
tions, but the right tail of the distribution of a that selects risky jobs is shaped diffe-
rently, much thicker. For both normal and lognormal, when a∗ rises, the conditional
mean of a rises (obviously), but while the conditional variance of the normal a falls,
the conditional variance of the lognormal a rises.13 Thus, the conditional variance of









13 This is all visible from our calculations, but will not be reproduced here.
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Table 1 Simulated estimates of ρ for varying ωr , σε and σa when ability is heterogeneous
A. Normal
σε : 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 5.00 5.50 6.00
ωr σa : 6.10 5.87 5.58 5.23 4.81 4.29 3.63 2.70
A1: ρ = 0.4
12 0.616 0.602 0.586 0.565 0.541 0.513 0.482 0.451
13 0.612 0.601 0.586 0.568 0.545 0.519 0.488 0.454
14 0.609 0.600 0.588 0.571 0.550 0.525 0.494 0.458
15 0.608 0.600 0.590 0.575 0.556 0.532 0.502 0.464
16 0.609 0.602 0.593 0.580 0.562 0.540 0.510 0.472
17 0.612 0.606 0.598 0.586 0.570 0.548 0.520 0.482
18 0.618 0.612 0.605 0.594 0.579 0.559 0.531 0.494
19 0.627 0.621 0.614 0.604 0.590 0.571 0.546 0.509
A2: ρ = 0.6
12 0.681 0.692 0.698 0.699 0.692 0.680 0.664 1.947
13 0.673 0.684 0.693 0.696 0.692 0.681 0.663 0.732
14 0.666 0.678 0.688 0.694 0.692 0.682 0.665 0.669
15 0.660 0.672 0.684 0.691 0.691 0.684 0.667 0.651
16 0.656 0.669 0.681 0.689 0.691 0.686 0.670 0.648
17 0.655 0.667 0.679 0.688 0.692 0.688 0.674 0.650
18 0.656 0.667 0.679 0.688 0.693 0.691 0.678 0.653
19 0.661 0.671 0.681 0.689 0.695 0.694 0.683 0.658
B. Lognormal
σln ε : 1.15 1.20 1.25 1.30 1.35
σln a : 1.36 1.34 1.31 1.26 1.17
σε : 3.21 3.69 4.24 4.89 5.67
ωr σa : 5.75 5.46 5.04 4.41 3.36
B1: ρ = 0.4
12 0.141 0.149 0.163 0.190 0.259
13 0.159 0.167 0.179 0.205 0.275
14 0.190 0.192 0.201 0.224 0.291
15 a 0.235 0.232 0.249 0.311
16 a a a 0.281 0.334
17 a a a 0.329 0.357
18 a a a 0.376 0.385
19 a a a 0.424 0.429
B2: ρ = 0.6
12 0.143 0.152 0.167 0.196 0.280
13 0.160 0.167 0.181 0.209 0.292
14 0.185 0.188 0.199 0.226 0.307
15 0.226 0.218 0.222 0.246 0.326
16 a 0.268 0.255 0.27 0.348
17 a a 0.306 0.303 0.372
18 a a a 0.346 0.401
19 a a a 0.411 0.434
a All labor force participants would choose for the risky job. The average wage on the safe jobs would not
be determined and ρ would not be estimated
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w˜r falls with a rise in a∗ in the normal case, whereas the conditional variance of w˜r
rises with a∗ in the lognormal case. Moreover, for a very negative a∗, there is hardly
any selection in the lognormal case, since all want the risky job. Thus, the conditional
mean of a is close to 0. In the normal case, there is always selection, and always a
conditional mean of a that is greater than 0.
We can only conclude that the predicted bias is very sensitive to variation in the spe-
cification of the model. Apparently, the overestimation of both the numerator and the
denominator precludes the emergence of simple patterns. One distributional assump-
tion leads to positive bias, another to negative bias and the basic pattern of sensitivity
to parameter values appears to be reflected in a U-shaped profile. Thus, ambiguity
remains within the set of parameter values we used for our simulations.14 However,
as empirical wage distributions resemble lognormality rather than normality, we may
conclude that underestimation of risk aversion is most likely.
Empirical evidence on the relevance of ability bias is not completely conclusive
either but tends to point in the direction of underestimation. In a Danish panel, Diaz
Serrano et al. (2003), distinguishing residual variance between individuals (permanent
shocks) and within individual incomes over time (transitory shocks), find significant
wage compensation for both components, thus indicating that the results from cross-
section OLS estimates cannot be wholly due to upward bias. The elasticity of wage
compensation, while still very low, increases by a third in the panel estimates rela-
tive to annual cross-sections on the same data. Bajdechi (2005), using NLSY data,
finds significant compensation for transitory shocks and insignificant compensation
for permanent shocks. With risk measured by IQ decile, the compensation for tran-
sitory shocks is unaffected, while compensation for permanent shocks increases and
becomes significant. Berkhout et al. (2005) use secondary school grades to condi-
tion on ability, and find that for higher vocational graduates the risk compensation
coefficient slightly increases, while for university graduates it falls substantially.
We conclude that if ability is unknown to individuals the estimated risk attitude is
unbiased, as unknown ability is simply a component of risk. If individuals do know
their ability and we have a case of unobserved heterogeneity, analytically the bias can
go either way, but empirically we consider underestimation more likely.
5 Conclusion
Risk compensation in wages has been estimated from OLS regression of wages on
residual variance in education/occupation. Selection biases may result in biased esti-
mates for the true price of risk because the true price is determined by the marginal
individual deciding to switch to more risky jobs. If individuals only differ in risk atti-
tude, we have a textbook case where the simple two-stage OLS estimation obtains an
unbiased estimate of marginal risk aversion. If only risk differs between individuals,
risk aversion is overestimated. If only ability differs between individuals, assumptions
14 We have considered allowing for correlation between ability and risk. But apart from the fact there is
no obvious reason to expect this, we conjecture that this will not resolve the basic ambiguity. Nor will we
dwell on the possibility that risk aversion simultaneously varies among individuals, as Sect. 4 has indicated
that this will lead into very complicated and untractable situations.
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on information are vital. With individuals ignorant on their abilities, as in the fifth of
Smith’s famous principal circumstances for wage differentials, abilities are a source
of risk and risk aversion is estimated without bias. If individuals themselves know
their abilities, we have a textbook case of selectivity bias from unobserved heteroge-
neity. The equation for the bias shows an ambiguity in sign that is not resolved by
simulation. This also implies that attempts to correct for this bias must be aware of
the consequences of alternative distributional specifications. On empirical grounds,
we think that underestimation is more likely than overestimation, but as always, this
conjecture rests on the realism of the simple selection model we analyzed.
Appendix: A lognormal specification
We can derive analytically that utility is a mean-variance utility function—as in the
main text—if wage income is log-normally distributed and utility displays constant
relative risk aversion, see also Weiss (1972). Assume that all income is consumed, and
there is no other asset or non-labor income as in the text. Utility is then given by:
u(w) = w
1−ρ




where ρ ≡ 1 − β is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. w is log-normally distri-
buted with mean µ and standard deviation σ : ln w ∼ N (µ, σ 2). Taking logarithms
and expectations E[·] of the utility function yields:
E [ln[u(w)]] = βE[ln(w)] − ln(β) = βµ − ln(β).
Using the properties of the normal distribution, we can express the variance V [·] of
utility as
V [u(w)] = β2σ 2.
Therefore, we can derive that ln[u(w)] is log-normally distributed with mean
βµ − ln(β) and variance β2σ 2 : ln [u(w)] ∼ N (βµ − ln(β), βσ). Since E[ln z] =
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where w¯ is the mean wage. Taking logarithms gives a utility function having only the
mean and variance as its arguments:
ln E[u(x)] = ln(1/β) + β ln w¯ − 1
2
β(1 − β)σ 2.
After taking an affine transformation, we can therefore express utility as a mean-
variance function v(µ, σ 2):
v(µ, σ 2) = ln w¯ − 1
2
ρσ 2,
where v(µ, σ 2) ≡ ln[Eu(w)]/(1 − ρ) − c and c ≡ ln(1/(1 − ρ))/ρ.
From the last equation we see that expected utility is only a function of log income
and the variance of log income. Therefore, our model in the main text carries over to
the case for log-normally distributed wages, provided that non-labor income is zero
and utility features constant relative risk aversion. Note that after estimation of the
wage equation on log wages, ρ should now correctly be interpreted as the coefficient
of relative risk aversion and not as the coefficient of absolute risk aversion.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom-
mercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
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